The Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Border: A Legacy of Soviet Imperialism by Abbate, Liam
Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship 
Volume 4 Issue 1 Article 4 
6-1-2021 
The Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Border: A Legacy of Soviet 
Imperialism 
Liam Abbate 
Santa Clara University, lp2abbate@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc 
Recommended Citation 
Abbate, Liam (2021) "The Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Border: A Legacy of Soviet Imperialism," Undergraduate 
Journal of Global Citizenship: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol4/iss1/4 
This item has been accepted for inclusion in DigitalCommons@Fairfield by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It is brought to you by DigitalCommons@Fairfield with permission from the rights-
holder(s) and is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses, you need to obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 









Kyrgyzstan, a small country in Central Asia, 
shares a complex border with its neighbor 
Uzbekistan. While these borders were 
created during the Soviet era, and were 
drawn by leaders in Moscow, in the post-
Soviet years new problems have arisen from 
the complex borders. A number of different 
ethnic groups are spread amongst the five 
Uzbek exclaves and two Tajik exclaves that 
are located adjacent to Kyrgyz territory. 
This difficult set of national borders also 
complicates sharing the water that flows thru 
the Ferghana Valley. 
 
Introduction 
In this paper, I will analyze the international 
border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan, and how the contemporary 
Uzbek-Kyrgyz border’s division of the 
surrounding ethnic groups remains as a 
legacy of the Soviet era. I start by explaining 
the complicated border which is the basis for 
the dispute. I then examine the origins of the 
dispute back in the Soviet era, before 
moving on to developments in the dispute 
since Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan gained 
their independence in. Finally, I explore the 
wider geopolitical implications of the 
dispute, particularly in relation to the U.S.-
China rivalry.  
 
Background 
Kyrgyzstan is among the poorest of the 
nations of Central Asia: its per capita is a 
mere tenth of its larger neighbor 
Kazakhstan.1 Formerly a constituent 
republic of the Union of the Soviet Socialist 
Republics, the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist 
Republic declared independence as 
Kyrgyzstan on August 31, 1991. Between 
1924 and 1927 Soviet officials drew curly 
borders for their then-constituent republics, 
and in the process, they separated groups of 
Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tajiks inhabiting the 
Ferghana Valley:2 home to nearly one 
quarter of Central Asia’s population.3 
 Unlike the other former Soviet 
republics of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan has 
largely experienced democracy since 
independence. Revolutions ousted the 
Kyrgyz presidents in 2005 and 2010; the 
former revolution was peaceful, while the 
latter included carnage in its chronology.4 
Furthermore, a competitive election in 2017 
resulted in a peaceful transition from 
President Almazbek Atambayev to his 
protégé Sooronbay Jeenbekov, without a 
revolution. However, despite handing over 
power, former President Atambayev 
continues to harshly criticize the actions of 
his successor. President Jeenbekov has also 
worked to consolidate his power, as he has 
threatened to imprison a political opponent 
of his – Ömürbek Babanov – on the charge 
of inciting conflict between the ethnics 
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.5 
 Kyrgyzstan lies between Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan in the west and south, China 
in the east, and Kazakhstan in the north. The 
country is covered in mountains with 88 
mountain ranges.6 These mountain ranges 
separate communities within Kyrgyzstan, 
contributing to regional differences and 
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national instability.7 The capital of Bishkek 
is the main population center for northern 
Kyrgyzstan, while the area between Jalal-
Abad and Osh comprises the most populated 
part of southern Kyrgyzstan. As seen in 
Figure 1, the former lies just South of 
Kazakhstan while the latter area lies just east 
of Uzbekistan; Osh and Bishkek are two 
cities the lie outside of the seven oblasts 
(regions) and hold an equivalent status as 
the oblasts.8 
 The Ferghana Valley is an area 
divided among Kyrgyzstan and its 
neighbors: Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The 
valley’s fertile agricultural land produces a 
large amount of food for Central Asia, while 
subject to the availability of water.9 The 
twisting borders and narrow stretches of 
land are relics of Soviet rule and continue to 
cause disputes between Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan. Its 10 million inhabitants 
include ethnic Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks.10 
However, during the Soviet era, residents 
became accustomed to their ability to cross 
the inter-Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), as 
the Ferghana Valley lacked the border 
controls present in other areas of the Soviet 
Union.11 
 
Figure 1. Political Divisions of Kyrgyzstan, map 
from Bigstock (Richard Weitz, “Kyrgyzstan and the 
Afghan Campaign’s Logistical Challenges,” Second 




Misaligned Ethnicities in the Ferghana 
Valley 
 While many countries have borders 
that were drawn arbitrarily, Kyrgyzstan’s 
borders are especially problematic. There 
are five exclaves where portions of Uzbek 
territory are completely surrounded by 
Kyrgyzstan: Sokh, Shohimardon, Chon 
Qora/Qalacha, and Jani-Ayil (Halmiyon), as 
well as two Tajik exclaves.12 At 350 km2, 
Sokh is the largest of these exclaves, and 
according to Baumgartner, has experienced 
several conflicts between its 50,000 Uzbek 
citizens and the guards securing the Kyrgyz 
border.13 To complicate matters further, 
Sokh’s residents are 99% ethnic Tajiks.14 
This mismatch of residency and identity is 
not unique to the Sokh exclave; national 
borders separate divide ethnic groups of the 
Ferghana Valley while pushing together 
other distinct groups (fig. 2; fig. 3).15 
Furthermore, this disconnect between ethnic 
identity and location within national 
boundaries is especially pronounced in 
northern Tajikistan, where Uzbeks and 
Tajiks are interspersed16 like chocolate and 
vanilla in a marble cake. 
  
Figure 2. Political Map of the Ferghana Valley 
(Sabatar, “Normalization process between.”). 
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Figure 3. Demographics of the Fergana Valley 
(“Central Asia: Tensions.”). 
 Ethnic tensions in the region are 
nothing new and most recently flared up in 
2010 when clashes between the two ethnic 
groups left hundreds of locals dead.17 The 
Soviet era infrastructure impacts 
contemporary disagreements over water 
resources and the border itself. A Soviet-
built network of canals connects the water 
supply systems of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan, causing disagreements over 
how much water each of the three “stans” 
should receive.18 In general, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan have an abundance of water but 
lack electricity, while Uzbekistan (and 
Kazakhstan) have excess electricity but a 
scarce amount of water.19 There have been 
multiple efforts to improve the water 
distribution system in the Ferghana Valley. 
The world bank funded improvements and 
modernizations in Uzbekistan’s water 
infrastructure from 2010 to 2016.20 
Similarly, the International Water 
Management Institute had a project started 
in 2001 which sought to respect local needs 
for water resources and improve the soil 
fertility in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Tajikistan.21 In 2017, Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan were able to agree on a dam on 
the Naryn River, while in 2018, 
Uzbekistan’s president announced his 
support for the Rogun dam in Tajikistan. 
Continued cooperation is possible, provided 
the three nations are willing to overlook the 
“deep-seated mistrust”22 that currently 
exists. 
 Throughout history the Ferghana 
Valley had been subjected and inhabited by 
numerous cultures, such as the Greeks, 
Arabs, Mongols, and Turks, all of which 
affected the socio-political landscape of the 
valley.23 In the mid-19th century Tsarist 
Russia conquered the Ferghana Valley from 
the Khanate of Qo’qon.24 Also known as 
Kokand, the Khanate was not ethnically-
based, but rather was a “dynastic and feudal 
entity.”25 
 Many of the issues from the Kyrgyz-
Uzbek border and other borders in the 
region are a product of Russian imperialism 
– first in the way of the Russian Empire, and 
later by the hand of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR). Before 1924, 
when the creation of the Kyrgyzstan-
Uzbekistan border began, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan had not existed as sovereign 
states. According to Megoran, there were 
not Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic groups quite 
the way there are today.26 Before the 
creation of the border in the 1920s, ethnic 
identification was not familiar to many 
inhabitants of Central Asia.27 The history of 
migrations in the region had not provided 
clear, geographically segregated ethnic 
groups. The Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, and 
Kazakhs likely all descended from the 
people inhabiting the Uzbek confederation 
of the fifteenth century.28 The origins of the 
Kyrgyz people are less clear, but the 
consensus is that part of the Kyrgyz 
population migrated from southern Siberia 
to modern Kyrgyzstan in the fifteenth 
century, but that another portion of the 
Kyrgyz population is descended from 
nomads who had arrived in the region long 
before the fifteenth century.29 When 
considered on the basis of language, the 
Tajiks are distinct from the other four large 
ethnic groups of post-Soviet Central Asia: 
the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and 
Turkmens,30 who all speak Turkic 
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languages.31 The Tajik Language, however, 
is a relative of Persian.32 
The Soviet Union selected historical 
designations and used them as the basis for 
ethnicities, by codifying distinct languages, 
selecting capitals for the union republics, 
and compiling national historiographies.33 
The ethnicity names created by the Soviet 
Union did not match the self-identification 
of residents of Central Asia: boundary 
surveyors reported confusion about 
matching people to ethnic labels if their own 
labels were not on the official list of Central 
Asian ethnonyms. Perhaps most 
consequentially, the Soviet officials drew 
borders between the Uzbek Soviet Socialist 
Republic (SSR), the Kirghiz SSR, and the 
other central Asian SSRs. Even after the 
creation of these borders, many residents did 
not “distinguish between Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan”.34 
 
A New International Border 
 Kyrgyzstan’s most important 
relations are with its neighbors: Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and China, as well 
as nearby Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. 
Uzbekistan has accused both Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan of inadequately protecting 
their borders, allowing an unlimited flow of 
drugs to travel across the latter two 
countries.35 Uzbekistan relied on its 
authoritarian dictator Islam Karimov to 
strongly enforce its borders – Karimov died 
in 2016. 
 Upon independence in 1991, the 
border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
became an international border overnight. 
Initially, the border was not tangible and the 
respective countries made a minimal effort 
to demarcate the border.36 However, over 
the next few years, political and economic 
differences between Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan caused the lenient border 
practices to disintegrate. In 1993, 
Uzbekistan temporarily closed its border to 
Kyrgyzstan and introduced its own unique 
currency. Later on, Uzbekistan abandoned 
daylight savings time and adopted the Latin 
alphabet, all the while Kyrgyzstan kept 
daylight savings and the Cyrillic alphabet.37 
Disagreements have pitted the Ferghana 
Valley portion of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan against the remainder of the 
respective countries. During the 1990s, the 
Ferghana Valley played an important role in 
Tajikistan’s civil war,38 providing many 
anti-regime fighters.39 Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan also experienced regional 
instability in the 1990s, in which their 
portions of the Ferghana Valley experienced 
unrest. During that period, there were 
extremists from the Ferghana Valley who 
executed sporadic attacks in southern 
Kyrgyzstan.40  
 The situation between Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan became more tense in 1999. 
In January 1999, Uzbekistan closed its 
border for an indefinite amount of time. On 
February 13, 1999, President Karimov 
declared that “Kyrgyzstan is a poor country, 
and it is not my job to look after the 
people”.41 In August 1999, The Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) – an 
organization of “dissident Islamist guerillas 
headed by Ferghana Valley exiles linked to 
militant Islamist groups in Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan”42 – invaded southern 
Kyrgyzstan and adjacent areas of Tajikistan. 
As a consequence of the IMU’s actions, 
Uzbekistan began erecting a fence – which 
is two meters high - along its Ferghana 
Valley border; factories in Uzbekistan were 
required to fire any employees who were 
ethnically Kyrgyz. The creation of a 
borderland continued as President Karimov 
decreed that all visitors to Uzbekistan 
staying longer than three days needed a 
visa.43 Understandably, this did not go over 
well with Kyrgyzstan, for as Karimov knew 
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quite well, most Kyrgyzstan’s residents were 
already struggling economically. 
 
The Chinese and the Americans 
 The other important state actors 
interacting with Kyrgyzstan are the U.S. and 
Russia, who vie with China for influence in 
Kyrgyzstan. The U.S. global war on terror 
has affected Kyrgyzstan, albeit not as 
severely as Afghanistan, and pressured it to 
strengthen its border security.44 However, 
Russia, China, and the U.S. do not place 
Kyrgyzstan as a high priority, meaning each 
state does not have the goal of eliminating 
the influence of the other two.45 
Nevertheless, these three major powers have 
reasons to maintain an interest in 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 China has the greatest reason to 
worry; its officials fear that instability in the 
Kyrgyz Republic could contribute to unrest 
in China,46 particularly the autonomous 
territory of Xinjiang which is home to a 
large number of ethnic Uyghurs. Uyghurs 
and Kyrgyz are both Turkic ethnic groups. 
The U.S.’s concerns regarding Kyrgyzstan 
derive from its proximity to Afghanistan: 
only Tajikistan separates the two countries. 
The short distance separating Kyrgyzstan 
and Afghanistan has allowed the U.S. to use 
Manas International Airport in the former 
for its military operations in the latter.47 The 
U.S. found this arrangement necessary after 
Uzbekistan expelled U.S. military officers 
from its territory in 2005. 
Conclusion 
 The Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border 
dispute has taken a century to develop into 
something threatening enough to make the 
two neighbors adversaries of one another. 
The borders as drawn by the Soviets fail to 
align with the distribution of persons of 
differing ethnicities; the enclaves only make 
negotiations more difficult.48 Perhaps the 
national borders could be redrawn by the 
countries themselves, allowing the borders 
to align with the ethnic groups in the valley. 
It would also be beneficial for the countries 
of the Ferghana Valley (Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) if they could 
devise a plan to share the water in the valley. 
The situation would also benefit from 
Uzbekistan being more understanding of 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 Yet, perhaps Uzbekistan is not the 
biggest threat to Kyrgyzstan’s well-being. 
Megoran argues that middle-class Kyrgyz 
people worry most about the elites 
destroying the country. Uzbeks agree, and 
one Uzbek told a researcher that the ‘big 
ones,’ or the wealthy elites, “keep gobbling 
[up] [Kyrgyzstan] the way they are at the 
moment, the mountains themselves may 
disappear”.49 This reasoning suggests that 
Kyrgyzstan’s income inequality is causing 
issues that should not be neglected. 
Logically, the residents hope for no 
continuation of the environmental 
degradation that occurred under Soviet rule, 
although the Soviet environmental damage 
persists in Kyrgyzstan50 – and other portions 
of the former U.S.S.R. This hope of theirs 
opposes any plans to exploit the land and the 
common people of Kyrgyzstan for the 
benefits of the wealthier elites. Creating a 
more just and equitable society could 
improve the socio-economic stability within 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 The first step in decreasing income 
inequality is to decrease corruption in the 
Kyrgyz government. If the politicians in 
power ceased imprisoning their opponents 
or purging governmental officials they 
quarreled with, government transparency 
and fairness could emerge. If international 
aid was permitted to reach the communities 
it is intended to benefit, better economic 
opportunities could emerge for all residents 
of Kyrgyzstan. Providing more economic 
opportunities for the economically 
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marginalized residents of Kyrgyzstan is the 
most promising solution to this border 
dispute, because a major source of tension 
over the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan border is 
the movement of migrants from Kyrgyzstan 
to Uzbekistan in search of better-paying 
employment.51 Like many border disputes, 
this dispute is a proxy: a proxy for the 
sources of distress causing residents of 
Kyrgyzstan to leave their homeland in 
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